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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
In Russia the administrative regulation remains rather active. Partially it is explained by the objec-
tive reasons. Any transition period, resulted form the large changes in the economic and social 
foundations, is accompanied by inevitable contradictions and lagging in the development of the 
adequate institutions and market basis. Imperfections in the market mechanism at this period are 
compensated with direct government's interference; one of the forms is the administrative regula-
tion. Decrease in the speed of the social transformations allows reducing the administrative control. 
The relaxation of the administrative regulation of economic activity is one of the declared at the 
federal level long-run policies in Russia. 
Russia is a federal state and essential influence on the economic and institutional characteristics is 
exerted by the sub-federal level. The wide legislative and executive autonomy allows the regional 
authorities to introduce local mechanisms of the administrative regulation sometimes contradicting 
the federal macroeconomic policy. 
The main spheres of the administrative entry regulation in Russia are registration of enterprises, li-
censing of business undertakings and certification of goods and services. The review of the regional 
legal documents shows the active participation of this level authority in the determination of the 
registration procedure cost, duration and list of the obligatory documents. They widely used the op-
portunity to regulate the licensing as well. The study of the legislation revealed a lot of documents 
adopted in the regions and directed at the establishing rules and standards of goods and services cer-
tification, this legislative initiatives dealt not only with the voluntary certification but extended over 
the obligatory one. An interesting observed fact is high level of heterogeneity in the administrative 
entry regulation across Russian regions both in the rules of the procedures and in the associated 
cost. 
Development of the administrative reform and further steps aimed at the deregulation and de-
bureaucratization in Russia pose two questions: 1) what are the motivations of the regional politi-
cians to use the administrative entry regulation; and 2) what are the consequences of these sub-
federal initiatives?  
Predictions presented in the literature are ambiguous. If a government is benevolent and pursues 
social efficiency, the entry regulation is associated with higher consumer welfare, lower price, 
fewer market failures and fair competition. However if the government is captured, corrupt or pur-
sues its own interests results of the regulation are unpredictable. Our estimations have shown the 
negative effects of the sub-federal administrative regulation on the regional economic and social 
indicators in the high performing regions, however in the low performing ones the regulation was 
associated with some positive effect. 
If the government is a benevolent the motivations of the regional politicians to the regulation are 
determined by the symptoms of the market failures. If the government is captured the regulatory 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
5
policy expresses the interests of the powerful industrial or consumer groups. If the government is 
interested in the maximization of political support or personal income the regulation is pursued for 
the benefits of politicians and bureaucrats. The conclusion of the undertaken estimations is that the 
motivations of the sub-federal authorities were not benevolent. Evidences of self-interested policy 
in the regulatory initiatives are revealed. 
The results show that the sub-federal authorities in Russia acted in the administrative regulation out 
of self-interests. Their intervention was harmful for regional economic performance, for instance, 
each initiative in the certification was associated with 0.03% decrease of GRP growth and 0.01% 
decrease of trade turnover growth in the regions. The negative impact was stronger in the high per-
forming regions. However the regulation resulted in some positive outcomes in the regions experi-
enced problems with economic growth. Russia is in the stage of economic growth now, and it is 
important to develop institutional environment supporting this dynamics. Results of the project are 
arguments in favor of the declared policy of deregulation. And despite of the serious critics of the 
recent steps undertaken toward centralization the restrictions imposed by Russian federal govern-
ment on the realm of the sub-federal jurisdiction in the administrative regulation should be admitted 
as reasonable. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The administrative regulation is one of the forms of a government control over an economic activ-
ity. Specific features of the administrative regulation are implementation through bureaucratic pro-
cedures and relatively high level of discretion delegated to officials. The international experience 
demonstrates that an administrative regulation is an exceptional measure of government interfer-
ence into markets and is used when other tools are very ineffective or fail to succeed in getting de-
sired results. Reasons for a limited sphere for administrative regulation usage are high transaction 
costs, increase of price, decrease of resource productivity and, more importantly, creation of 
grounds for a corruption and a rent-seeking behavior of government officials. 
In Russia administrative regulation remains rather active. Partially its extent is explained by objec-
tive reasons. Any transition period, resulting form large changes in the economic and social founda-
tions, is accompanied by inevitable contradictions and lagging in the development of adequate insti-
tutions and markets. Very often, instead of speeding up of the development of institutional founda-
tions, the imperfections in the market mechanism at this period are compensated with a direct gov-
ernment regulation. Decrease in the speed of the social transformations allows reduction in the gov-
ernment control. The relaxation of the administrative regulation of economic activity is one of the 
declared at the federal level long-run policies in Russia. However this task is not easy due to the 
aspirations of regulatory agencies to reproduce themselves and to extend their influence. 
Russia is a federal state and essential influence on the economic and institutional characteristics is ex-
erted by the sub-federal level, which has a wide autonomy in the decision making regarding govern-
ance methods of the economic processes on the territory. Their wide legislative and executive power 
allows the regional authorities to introduce local mechanisms of administrative regulation. Sometimes 
federal level priorities do not correspond to the directions of the sub-federal policies. Examples of 
such policy are increase of the sub-federal budget subsidies to local producers in the response to the 
reduction of the subsidizing from the federal budget and creation of interregional trade barriers de-
spite the central authorities measures aimed at the integrity of Russian internal market. 
The main spheres of administrative regulation in Russia are registration of enterprises, licensing of 
business undertakings and certification of goods and services. Corresponding to the law of 1990 
registration was executed by the local governments, cities and districts. Since July 2002 however 
functions of the registration were transferred to the territorial departments of the federal tax organs. 
Organizations executing the licensing are federal ministries and departments and executive bodies 
of the subjects of Russian Federation. However there is a distinct tendency to reduce the sub-federal 
level power with every reform in the license legislation and to move it to the federal level. The cer-
tification authority legislatively belongs exclusively to the federal government. 
It means that the interference of the sub-federal government into the administrative regulation either 
was legislatively excluded, what was observed for the certification and registration of enterprises, or 
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was essentially restricted, an example of this case is licensing. It was supposed that the centralized 
approach would equalize conditions of business development and of competition on the territory of 
Russia provided that the sub-federal level authorities will follow the norms of federal legislation. 
However even the formal conditions of business development differed among the Russian regions 
and very often they violated the federal legislation. 
Despite the fact that according to the federal legislation the sub-federal level was not included into 
the process of the registration procedure regulation, the review of the regional legal documents 
(Appendix A1) shows the active participation of this level authority in the determination of cost, 
terms and list of the obligatory documents (Tables A1–A6). They widely used the opportunity to 
regulate licensing as well (Table A7). The study of the legislation revealed a lot of documents 
adopted in the regions and directed at the establishing rules and standards of goods and services cer-
tification, what is federal jurisdiction. Moreover this legislative initiative dealt not with the volun-
tary certification only but extended over the obligatory one (Table A8). 
Objective of the study is to study the mentioned sub-federal administrative regulation in Russian 
regions. Two questions will be addressed: 1) what are the consequences of the sub-federal initia-
tives aimed at the administrative procedures of registration, licensing and certification; and 2) what 
are the regional politicians' motivations to use these methods of the regulation. 
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. Theoretical predictions 
Predictions and hypotheses about effects and motivations of regulation are discussed in the public 
interest theory, capture theory, economic theory of regulation, and in the tollbooth theory. 
The public interest theory regards any level of government as a benevolent entity that pursues social 
efficiency and regulatory policy is designed to maximize social welfare (Stigler, 1971; Joskow and 
Noll, 1981). A basis for government regulation of the economic activity is that under certain condi-
tions unrestrained competition does not work effectively. These market failures are natural monop-
oly, monopoly, and externalities. In the case of a natural monopoly the problem is that there is a 
fundamental conflict between allocative efficiency and productive efficiency; entry regulation per-
mits only one firm to produce (as required for productive efficiency), whereas price regulation re-
stricts the firm to setting the socially optimal price (as required for allocative efficiency). Antitrust 
action can be used to reduce monopoly power and increase economic efficiency. In the case of ex-
ternalities, imposition of restrictions on an activity that generates negative externalities can result in 
socially preferred allocation. According to the public interest theory the regulation cures market 
failures and may be able to raise social welfare.  
The capture theory states that either regulation is supplied in response to the industry's demand or the 
regulatory agency comes to be controlled by the industry over time, in other words legislators and 
regulators are captured by the industry (Bernstein, 1955). The conclusion of the capture theory is that 
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the regulation is not strongly correlated with the existence of market failures, regulation is inherently 
pro-producer and it tends to raise industry profit. In potentially competitive industries the regulation 
supports prices above cost and prevents entry from dissipating rents. In naturally monopolistic indus-
tries the regulation has little effect on price and above-normal profit is allowed to be earned. 
The economic theory of regulation holds that regulation is not associated with market failures how-
ever it is not exclusively pro-producer, and evidence of this statement is observation of waves of 
regulation and deregulation. The key assumption of the economic theory of regulation is that regu-
lation redistributes wealth and is supplied in response to the demands of interest groups acting to 
maximize their income (Stigler, 1971). Regulators aim to remain in office and design the regulation 
to maximize political support. Interest groups, understanding this goal, compete for favorable regu-
lation by offering political support in exchange. Modeling the regulatory policy based on the prem-
ise that legislator or regulator implements a policy maximizing political support (Peltzman, 1976) 
generates several testable hypotheses. Firstly, there is a tendency for regulation to benefit relatively 
small groups with strong preferences for regulation at the cost of relatively large groups with weak 
preferences for regulation. Secondly, even if regulation is pro-producer, policy will not be set so as 
to maximize industry profit because of the constraining influence of consumer groups. Thirdly, 
regulation is most likely in relatively competitive or relatively monopolistic industries due to the 
biggest effect on the group's well-being. Becker's model (Becker, 1983) focuses on the competition 
between interest groups assuming that regulators just transmit the pressure of interest groups and 
regulation is used to increase welfare of more influential ones. One of the inferences of this ap-
proach is a hypothesis that presence of market failures makes regulation more likely because the 
gain to some interest groups is large relative to the loss to other interest groups and the former have 
stronger incentives to influence regulators. 
The tollbooth theory holds that regulation is pursued for the benefits of politicians and bureaucrats 
while the industry is left worse off by regulation. Any government intervention aimed at market 
failures leads to rents for government employees and to a certain amount of corruption or other 
abuse of power; there is a trade-off between market failures and government failures (McChesney, 
1987; Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000). Some authors suggests that corruption is beneficial for the 
economy especially when bureaucratic regulations are cumbersome (Huntington, 1968; Lui, 1985), 
while others ague that corruption entails damaging consequences for growth, efficiency and invest-
ments (Shliefer and Vishny, 1993;. Djankov et al., 2002; De Soto, 1990; Shang-Jin Wei, 2000; 
Mauro, 1995). Abuse of power and corruption are perceptibly different in the different societies and 
is determined by many economic and social forces among the fundamental ones are level of rents in 
general and market structure (Ades and Tella, 1999). 
Predictions about aims and consequences of the regulation are ambiguous. The summary of the re-
viewed theoretical results is presented in the Table 1. 
2.2. Some observations about administrative regulation in Russia 
The problems of the administrative barriers identification, cycles in their development, exploitation, 
and distraction in Russia are discussed in Auzan, Kryuchkova, Kalyagin, Ovsyannikova, Obidenov, 
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Tambovtsev, Shastitko (2002). The authors note the rise of activity of the regional level govern-
ments in the creation of new administrative barriers as a counterbalance for the federal level deci-
sions aimed at the decreasing of the barrier regulation. Obolentsev (2004) analyzes administrative 
regulation of federal, sub-federal and local jurisdiction in Russia aimed at investment activity and 
concludes that duration and costs of the procedures are very high, he notes that the most difficult are 
the first steps opening the investment cycle; this creates problem of "bottle-neck" from the very be-
ginning and weakens incentives to invest. Degtyarev and Malikov (2003) make conclusion about 
corruption base of the administrative barriers in Russia. These authors and Auzan and Kryuchkova 
(2001) provide several quantitative estimations of transaction costs caused by the administrative 
barriers in Russia. Problems of interaction and partnership between business and governments in-
cluding the administrative barriers are discussed in Zausaev, Vorontsova, and Pustovit (2005) and 
in Kurbatova and Aparina (2003). The authors emphasize that the regional executive authorities 
possess a wide variety of tools to influence the producers, on the one hand, and inefficiency of the 
regional models of interaction with business, on the other hand. Evidences of public interest theory, 
tollbooth view and regulatory capture theories are found in the entry regulations of Russian alcohol 
market in Yakovlev's study (Yakovlev, 2006); prevalence of the theoretical predictions depends on 
the types of the regulation. 
This study contributes to the investigation of the administrative barriers in Russia and focuses on 
the sub-federal regulatory initiatives. The methodology of the paper owes a great deal to two em-
pirical studies testing the theoretical assumptions about effects of the government administrative 
regulation. De Soto (1990) analyzes entry regulation in Peru, he estimates official costs, official 
time, corruption and bureaucratic delays. Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shliefer (2002) 
present empirical data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries and cover the offi-
cial costs only. They show that countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption 
and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. The evidence is 
Table 1. Theoretical predictions 
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inconsistent with the public interest theory of regulation, but supports the view that entry regulation 
benefits politicians and bureaucrats.  
3. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
3.1. Tested hypotheses 
In this section testable hypotheses concerning the sub-federal administrative regulation are formu-
lated based on the reviewed theoretical predictions. The public interest theory predicts that govern-
ment's intervention should be associated with higher consumer welfare and fewer negative external-
ities. As the result the sub-federal administrative regulation increases social welfare.  
Hypothesis 1. The sub-federal administrative regulation increases social welfare. 
A common conclusion of all theories of the consideration is that the regulation prevents entry of 
new producers to markets.  
Hypothesis 2 The sub-federal administrative regulation results in entry barriers and in fewer pro-
ducers operating in the regional markets. 
The economic theory of regulation holds that a regulation is associated with market failures. The 
public interest theory suggests more precise prediction, that the regulation remedies market fail-
ures. However it also means that if some regions experience market failures then the regulators 
would choose more regulatory procedures. These statements allow formulation of the following 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 3. The sub-federal administrative entry regulation prevents market failures. 
Hypothesis 4. More active sub-federal administrative entry regulation is an attribute of regions 
which have serious market failures. 
Another attribute of the regions derived from the foundations of the theories of regulation is level of 
rent available for redistribution. One of the common conclusions of the capture theory, the theory of 
economic regulation and the tollbooth theory is that a regulation allows extracting rent from the po-
litical process and the regulatory system determines level of rent appropriation by different partici-
pants of the process. An implication is that regulators and interest groups should have stronger in-
centives for a regulatory activity when potential for distributed rent is high. However public interest 
theory's inference is that regulation is aimed at the decreasing of monopolistic prices and should 
reduce the rent. So, the suggested testable bidirectional relationship is as follows: 
Hypothesis 5. Intensive sub-federal administrative regulation is an attribute of regions where level 
of overall available rent is higher. 
The tollbooth theory holds that regulators are interested in maximization of their earning. Corrupt 
bureaucrats may set official fees low in order to increase their unofficial income; however they can 
be interested in longer duration of the procedures and in more documents needed to be presented; 
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waste of time creates incentives to avoid official ways and to get release from regulation. Dininio 
and Ortung (2004) note extensive variation of corruption at the regional level in Russia. These ar-
guments are base for the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 6. High level of the sub-federal administrative entry regulation, long duration and intro-
duction of additional required documents of the administrative procedures are attributes of regions 
which have higher level of abuse of power. 
The proposed hypotheses address the questions of the project. The first three hypotheses deal with 
the influence of the sub-federal administrative regulation on the regional performance and on the 
important features of the development, and the others relate to the driving forces and motivations of 
the regulators. 
3.2. Model specification 
The proposed hypotheses form several regressions. Hypothesis 1 implies regression of the regional 
economic outcomes on the regulation and on the other regional variables. However due to the de-
lays of the effects of the regulation and the regulatory decisions it is more correct to estimate the 
first differences of the target variables. 
1) [Economic performancert – Economic performancer(t–1)] = Σαn·[Sub-federal administrative regu-
lation of entrynrt – Sub-federal administrative regulation of entrynr(t–1)] + Σβi·[Regional structural 
variableirt – Regional structural variableir(t–1)] + τ·Year dummies + Errorrt. 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the regulation results in few producers. 
2) [Number of producersrt – Number of producersr(t–1)] = Σγn·[Sub-federal administrative regula-
tionnrt – Sub-federal administrative regulationnr(t–1)] + Σµi·[Regional structural variableirt – Re-
gional structural variableir(t–1)] + θ·Year dummies + Errorrt. 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 connect the sub-federal administrative regulation with market failures evoking 
the regulation. However hypothesis 5 suggests that rent-seeking behavior determines the regulatory 
initiatives. The estimation has to incorporate the property of the regulation to depend on the market 
failures, on the one hand, and to influence them on the other hand. The proposed estimation proce-
dure is the following two-equation system. 
3) [Sub-federal administrative regulationnrt – Sub-federal administrative regulationnr(t–1)] = 
Σηj [Indicator of market failurerj(t–1) – Indicator of market failurerj(t–2)] + λ·[Level of rentrt – Level of 
rentr(t–1)] + ω·Year dummies + Errorrt, 
4) [Indicator of market failurerjt – Indicator of market failurerj(t–1)] = Σφn·[Sub-federal administra-
tive regulationrn(t–1) – Sub-federal administrative regulationrn(t–2) ] + σ·Year dummies + Errorrt. 
Hypothesis 6 implies correlation between abuse of power and regulation; the most important is sup-
posed to be duration of the administrative procedures and introduction of additional documents. 
Minds of bureaucrats are unobservable: whether they are corrupt or benevolent. However we can 
observe outcomes of their behavior. If bureaucrats are corrupt the opportunities of the administra-
tive regulation and delegated discretions result in higher level of abuse of power. 
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5) Abuse of powerr = Σρn·Sub-federal administrative regulationnr + ψ Duration of the sub-federal 
administrative proceduresr + ςּAdditional documentsr + Errorr.  
Here t stands for the year, r — for the region, n — for the administrative regulation variable, i — for 
the variables controlling the spurious correlation, j — for the indicators of market failures.  
The expected results of the estimations depend on the sub-federal governments' attitudes towards 
the regulation of entry. If the regulation is benevolent then the predicted results are as follows: α>0, 
υ<0, λ<0, γ≤0, η>0 and φ<0. If the regulation is captured the results are υ>0, λ<0, γ≤0. If the regula-
tors stick to the behavior predicted by the economic theory of regulation then λ>0, γ≤0 and η>0. If 
the regulation is corrupt the results are λ>0, ρ>0, ψ>0, ς>0 and γ≤0.  
3.3. Data 
The analysis is based on the newly constructed data set, which describes the administrative regula-
tion of entry by start-up companies in 82 Russian regions, the period spans from 1992 through 
2005. The data cover administrative procedures of the registration of the sub-federal level in Russia 
that an entrepreneur needs to carry out to start a legally operating firm participating in industrial or 
commercial activity and the sub-federal initiatives in the licensing and in the certification as well. 
The information about registration procedures includes the official costs, time and documents nec-
essary for its completion. Source of the information is the legislative database "Consultant Plus. 
Regional Legislation". Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) developed a 
methodology for the construction a data set of starting business procedures, some parts of the ap-
proach are implemented in the data set construction. 
Indicators of the economic development of Russian regions are taken from the statistical yearbooks 
"Regions of Russia". Differences in the level of corruption across the Russian regions are measured 
in Transparency International and the Information for Democracy Foundation survey (Regional 
Corruption Indices 2000, 2002). 
The indicators supposed to be used in the hypotheses testing are presented in the Table 2. 
3.4. Estimations 
Three indicators characterizing the regional economic performance are gross regional product 
(GRP) and trade turnover as characteristics of the current performance and fixed capital investment 
as an indicator of future performance. Correspondingly, estimations of the first equation were done 
for three different indicators of regional development. In order to eliminate regional scale effects 
they are taken per capita. 
There are three forms of the administrative regulation we deal with: licensing, certification and reg-
istration of enterprises. The last procedure in contrast with the other ones differs for the enterprises 
with foreign investors' involvement and without foreign partners and has three characteristics: offi-
cial fees of the registration, additional documents introduced by the sub-federal authorities and du-
ration of the procedure. Aggregate cost measure of the registration includes official fees and 
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monetized value of the entrepreneur's time devoted to the waiting of the procedure results and to the 
preparation of additional documents. The time of the entrepreneur was valued as the product of time 
and per capita GRP expressed in per day terms, assuming that one document requires one day. 
Level of the overall cost of registration was determined as a sum of aggregate registration cost for 
enterprises with participation of foreign investors and without ones. 
Table 2. Empirical data 
Indicators Source of data/covered  period/number of Russian regions 
Measures of the sub-federal entry regulation: 
• Registration of enterprise: 
- Required time; 
- Official fees; 
- Number of the required documents 
• Certification: 
- Number of the adopted documents 
• Licensing: 
- Number of the adopted documents 
Legislative database "Consultant Plus. Regional 
Legislation" 
1992–2005 
82 regions 
Measures of the regional economic performance: 
• Gross regional product 
• Trade turnover 
• Investments 
Statistical yearbook "Regions of Russia" 
1995–2003 
79 regions 
Level of rent: 
• Overall profit of enterprises 
Statistical yearbook "Regions of Russia" 
1992–2004 
79 regions 
Number of producers: 
• Number of enterprises 
• Number of small business enterprises 
Statistical yearbook "Regions of Russia" 
1992–2004 
79 regions 
Market failures: 
• Pollutions 
• Sickness rate 
Statistical yearbook "Regions of Russia" 
1992–2004 
79 regions 
Abuse of position as government officials in Russian regions: 
• Corruption perception indexes 
TI and INDEM survey 
2000 
40 regions 
Due to the possible different behavior of the regional authorities at a stage of growth and at a stage 
of depression the estimations were done for the whole set of Russian regions and for the subsets of 
high and low performing ones. The estimation method is OLS regression. The detailed estimation 
results are in Appendix A2. The summary of the results is presented in the Table 3. 
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Table 3. Influence of the sub-federal administrative regulation on the regional development 
Coefficient α 
 
All regions High performing Low performing 
Gross regional product 
Licensing –0.532 
(0.416) 
–0.743 
(0.559) 
–0.694 
(0.568) 
Certification –0.312** 
(0.129) 
–0.327** 
(0.161) 
–0.139 
(0.208) 
Overall registration costs –0.279 
(0.835) 
–0.547 
(0.980) 
0.485** 
(0.223) 
Trade turnover 
Licensing –0.119 
(0.708) 
–0.129 
(0.094) 
–0.732 
(1.480) 
Certification –0.572** 
(0238) 
–0.793** 
(0.272) 
0.221 
(0.538) 
Overall registration costs –0.126 
(0.156) 
–0.108 
(0.166) 
–0.508 
(0.591) 
Fixed capital investment 
Licensing –0.671 
(0.708) 
–0.703* 
(0.414) 
–0.406 
(2.029) 
Certification 1.474 
(2.171) 
–0.464 
(1.195) 
11.628 
(7.772) 
Overall registration costs 0.179 
(0.143) 
0.813 
(0.740) 
0.121 
(0.083) 
Note: Standard error in the brackets; * — significant at 10%; ** — significant at 5%; *** — significant at 1%. 
The estimations revealed statistically significant correlations between administrative regulation and 
economic performance. However the directions of the regulatory effects differ for the high perform-
ing and low performing regions. Certification negatively influenced GRP and trade, while licensing 
restrained investment inflow in the high performing regions. However in the low performing re-
gions registration was associated with positive effects on GRP. So the public interest prediction that 
α>0 is confirmed for the regions which experienced problems with economic growth only. 
The second equation estimates influence of the regulation on the entry of new producers in the re-
gions. Two indicators were taken: total number of enterprises and number of small business enter-
prises. The theories of the consideration suggest γ≤0. The estimations did not reveal any positive 
significant correlation, moreover the significant and negative effect of licensing on the small busi-
ness development in the high performing Russian regions was observed (Table 4). 
Equations 3 and 4 assess contribution of the market failures and rent-seeking into the regional activ-
ity aimed at the implementation of the administrative procedures on the one hand and effect of the 
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regulation on the market failures on the other hand. Two market failure indicators were chosen: 
sickness rate and air pollutions produced by stationary sources. Level of overall profit in the regions 
is supposed to reflect a level of rent available for redistribution. The results of the interest are pre-
sented in the Tables 5, 6. 
Table 4. Influence of the sub-federal administrative regulation on the entry in the business 
Coefficient γ 
 
All regions High performing Low performing 
Number of enterprises 
Licensing 0.311 
(3.473) 
0.124 
(0.396) 
0.101 
(0.080) 
Certification –0.113 
(0.106) 
–0.788 
(1.121) 
–0.435 
(0.305) 
Overall registration costs –0.385 
(0.664) 
–0.568 
(0.654) 
0.717 
(3.280) 
Number of small business enterprises 
Licensing –0.127* 
(0.074) 
–0.155* 
(0.085) 
–0.126 
(0.158) 
Certification –0.148 
(0.224) 
–0.361 
(0.240) 
0.342 
(0.616) 
Overall registration costs 0.397 
(1.410) 
0.127 
(1.410) 
0.619 
(0.658) 
Note: Standard error in the brackets; * — significant at 10%. 
Table 5. Influence of the market failures on the sub-federal administrative regulation 
Coefficient η 
 
All regions High performing Low performing 
Licensing 
Illness 0.124 
(0.754) 
0.647 
(1.261) 
–0.156 
(0.903) 
Pollution 4.184 
(17.229) 
–2.971 
(21.598) 
13.568 
(29.474) 
Certification 
Illness –0.270 
(0.209) 
–0.407 
(0.364) 
–0.259 
(0.223) 
Pollution –1.640 
(4.779) 
–0.112 
(6.229) 
–3.766 
(7.291) 
Overall registration costs 
Illness 4.230 
(5.962) 
5.248 
(9.457) 
3.715 
(4.043) 
Pollution 7034.441 
(10391.94) 
11444.37 
(15042.49) 
–633.436 
(7942.077) 
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The estimations did not confirm the predictions of public interest and economic theory of regulation 
that η>0. No statistically significant correlations supporting motivation of the administrative regula-
tion by market failures were received (Table 5).  
However the prediction of economic theory of regulation and tollbooth theory about rent-motivated 
behavior of regulators has got confirmation for the low performing regions. The significant and 
positive correlation between sub-federal initiatives in the registration procedure and total profit of 
regional producers was observed (Table 6). 
Table 6. Influence of rent level on the sub-federal administrative regulation 
Coefficient λ 
 
All regions High performing Low performing 
Licensing 0.508 
(0.646) 
0.421 
(0.738) 
–0.390 
(1.689) 
Certification –0.361 
(0.222) 
–0.328 
(o.213) 
–0.308 
(0.418) 
Overall registration costs 55.151 
(59.198) 
43.412 
(81.649) 
168.451*** 
(54.783) 
Note: Standard error in the brackets; *** — significant at 1%. 
Public interest theory suggests that regulation correct market failures and φ<0. However the estimations 
do not confirm this prediction, moreover the revealed significant correlation is positive (Table 7). 
Table 7. Influence of the sub-federal administrative regulation on the market failures 
Coefficient φ 
 
All regions High performing Low performing 
Illness 
Licensing –0.222 
(0.282) 
–0.187 
(0.345) 
–0.494 
(0.519) 
Certification 0.909 
(0.859) 
1.421 
(0.995) 
–1.691 
(1.848) 
Overall registration costs 0.333 
(0.580) 
–0.020 
(0.063) 
4.949** 
(2.018) 
Pollution 
Licensing –0.205 
(0.201) 
–0.280 
((0.196) 
–0.215 
(0.318) 
Certification –0.198 
(0.483) 
–0.550 
(0.547) 
0.163 
(0.112) 
Overall registration costs 0.417 
(0.390) 
0.319 
(0.411) 
0.195 
(0.161) 
Note: Standard error in the brackets; ** —significant at 5%. 
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The last equation estimates links between corruption and regulatory activity. The obtained results 
confirmed tollbooth predictions about non-benevolent motivations of the regulators (Table 8). It 
was suggested that extending of the procedures period and introduction of additional documents 
create ground for corruption. These variables are statistically significant and positively correlated 
with different corruption perception indexes.  
Table 8. Influence of the sub-federal administrative regulation on the corruption  
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Registration cost of  an enterprise without foreign 
investors  participation  
0.305 
(0.532) 
–0.148 
(0.239) 
0.105 
(0.145) 
0.132 
(0.161) 
Duration of the registration procedure for an 
enterprise without foreign investors participation 
0.140 
(0.453) 
–0.341 
(0.204) 
0.124 
(0.123) 
0.166 
(0.137) 
Additional documents for registration of an enterprise 
without foreign investors  participation 
0.130** 
(0.050) 
0.023 
(0.022) 
0.028* 
(0.014) 
0.034** 
(0.015) 
Registration cost of  an enterprise with foreign 
investors  participation  
–0.164 
(0.189) 
0.503 
(0.851) 
0.095 
(0.514) 
–0.401 
(0.571) 
Duration of the registration procedure for an 
enterprise with foreign investors participation 
–0.331 
(0.418) 
0.352* 
(0.188) 
0.064 
(0.114) 
–0.060 
(0.126) 
Additional documents for registration of an enterprise 
with foreign investors  participation 
0.078 
(0.072) 
0.005 
(0.023) 
–0.008 
(0.019) 
–0.004 
(0.022) 
Certification –0.019 
(0.028) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
–0.010 
(0.008) 
–0.0002 
(0.008) 
Licensing 0.002 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
–0.001 
(0.002) 
–0.002 
(0.002) 
Note: Standard error in the brackets; * — significant at 10%; ** — significant at 5%. 
4 .CONCLUSIONS 
The estimations of the proposed model have provided some support to each of the theories. How-
ever the predictions of the economic theory of regulation and of tollbooth theory have got more 
confirmations. If we distinguish between two types of predictions formulated in the theories: moti-
vation and results of the sub-federal initiatives in the administrative procedures, then the results of 
the estimations are as follows: 
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Table 9. Summary of the estimation results 
Theories Motivations Results 
Public interest   Confirmed for low performing regions 
(gross regional product) 
Confirmed for high performing regions 
(entry barriers) 
Capture theory  Confirmed for high performing regions 
(entry barriers) 
Economic regulation Confirmed for low performing regions 
(rent-seeking) 
Confirmed for high performing regions 
(entry barriers) 
Tollbooth theory Confirmed for low performing regions 
(rent-seeking) 
Confirmed for all set of regions  
(abuse of power) 
Confirmed for high performing regions 
(entry barriers) 
Conclusion of these results is that the sub-federal authorities did not act as benevolent; they were 
mostly motivated by self-interests. The sub-federal authorities' intervention was harmful for the 
high performing regions; the administrative regulation did not cure market failures and resulted in 
the creation of entry barriers for small business in these regions. However the sub-federal regulation 
was associated with higher production in the regions experienced difficulties with economic 
growth. 
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APPENDICES  
A1. Summary statistics 
Table A1. Summary statistics of the fees level for registration procedure of the enterprises without foreign investor in 
the Russian regions, divided by minimal monthly wage* 
 Minimum Maximum Median Average Standard deviation 
Variation 
coefficient 
1994 0.10 35 0.1 3.83 5.72 1.49 
1995 0.04 35 0.04 3.84 5.69 1.48 
1996 0.03 35 0.03 4.24 6.21 1.46 
1997 0.02 200 0.03 7.32 22.74 3.11 
1998 1 479 23.95 25.30 53.88 2.13 
1999 1 479 23.95 25.52 53.84 2.11 
2000 1 479 23.95 25.29 53.71 2.12 
2001 1 400 20 22.49 46.01 2.05 
2002 1 400 10 22.49 46.01 2.05 
2003 1 200 20 19.62 20.47 1.04 
2004 1 200 20 20.70 20.01 0.97 
2005 3 200 20 21.13 19.84 0.94 
* — From the legislative data base "Consultant Plus. Regional legislation". 
Table A2. Summary statistics for the duration of the registration procedure of the enterprises without foreign investors 
in the Russian regions 
 Minimum Maximum Median Average Standard deviation 
Variation 
coefficient 
1994 1 30 3 5.76 10.09 1.36 
1995 1 30 3 5.77 10.08 1.35 
1996 1 30 3 6.08 10.51 1.32 
1997 1 30 3 5.77 10.08 1.35 
1998 1 30 3 6.08 10.51 1.32 
1999 1 30 3 6.39 10.90 1.29 
2000 1 30 3 6.08 10.51 1.32 
2001 3 30 3 5.48 9.59 1.37 
2002 3 30 5 6.90 8.48 1.05 
2003 3 30 5 6.06 6.61 0.99 
2004 3 30 5 5.79 5.77 0.92 
2005 3 30 5 5.52 3.77 0.68 
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Table A3. Summary statistics for the number of the additional documents introduced in the Russian regions for the reg-
istration of the enterprises without foreign investors 
 Minimum Maximum Median Average Standard deviation 
Variation 
coefficient 
1994 0 3 0 0.15 0.56 0.27 
1995 0 3 0 0.14 0.55 0.25 
1996 0 3 0 0.11 0.47 0.25 
1997 0 4 0 0.15 0.62 0.24 
1998 0 4 0 0.15 0.62 0.24 
1999 0 4 0 0.15 0.62 0.24 
2000 0 4 0 0.14 0.57 0.24 
2001 0 4 0 0.13 0.56 0.22 
2002 0 4 0 0.15 0.60 0.25 
2003 0 4 0 0.11 0.56 0.21 
2004 0 2 0 0.05 0.30 0.15 
2005 0 2 0 0.05 0.30 0.15 
Table A4. Summary statistics of the fees level for registration procedure of the enterprises with foreign investor in the 
Russian regions, divided by minimal monthly wage  
 Minimum Maximum Median Average Standard deviation 
Variation 
coefficient 
1994 0.10 109.58 0.10 7.05 16.31 2.31 
1995 0.04 136.03 0.06 8.60 21.38 2.49 
1996 0.03 112.49 4.00 7.72 14.32 1.86 
1997 0.02 200.00 5.00 10.85 25.12 2.32 
1998 3.00 359.32 23.95 28.63 48.38 1.69 
1999 3.00 442.85 23.95 31.34 61.96 1.98 
2000 3.00 505.37 23.95 32.05 67.07 2.09 
2001 3.00 437.63 20.00 24.89 49.85 2.00 
2002 3.00 470.25 20.00 24.92 52.91 2.12 
2003 3.50 460.20 20.00 26.58 51.39 1.93 
2004 6.00 200.00 20.00 21.71 19.58 0.90 
2005 20.00 200.00 20.00 22.12 19.41 0.88 
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Table A5. Summary statistics for the duration of the registration procedure of the enterprises with foreign investors in 
the Russian regions 
 Minimum Maximum Median Average Standard deviation 
Variation 
coefficient 
1994 3 21 21 19.87 4.69 0.24 
1995 3 30 21 19.66 5.01 0.26 
1996 3 30 21 19.94 4.94 0.25 
1997 3 30 21 19.84 5.15 0.26 
1998 3 30 21 20.04 4.83 0.24 
1999 3 30 3 7.81 8.56 1.10 
2000 3 30 3 8.72 9.39 1.08 
2001 3 30 3 8.49 9.33 1.10 
2002 3 30 5 9.16 8.08 0.88 
2003 5 30 5 7.10 6.07 0.85 
2004 5 30 5 5.82 3.87 0.66 
2005 5 30 5 5.28 2.64 0.50 
Table A6. Summary statistics for the number of the additional documents introduced in the Russian regions for the reg-
istration of the enterprises with foreign investors  
 Minimum Maximum Median Average Standard deviation 
Variation 
coefficient 
1994 0 4 0 0.23 0.69 2.98 
1995 0 4 0 0.24 0.70 2.86 
1996 0 4 0 0.28 0.71 2.54 
1997 0 4 0 0.28 0.66 2.36 
1998 0 4 0 0.24 0.63 2.57 
1999 0 3 0 0.21 0.55 2.64 
2000 0 3 0 0.14 0.51 3.65 
2001 0 3 0 0.13 0.51 3.92 
2002 0 3 0 0.07 0.37 5.26 
2003 0 3 0 0.05 0.34 7.26 
2004 0 3 0 0.05 0.34 7.26 
2005 0 3 0 0.03 0.32 9.22 
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Table A7. Summary statistics for the number of documents adopted in the Russian regions concerning licensing 
 Minimum Maximum Median Average Standard deviation 
Variation 
coefficient 
1994 0 42 7 10.06 9.70 0.96 
1995 0 29 7 8.63 6.95 0.81 
1996 0 37 12 13.79 10.02 0.73 
1997 0 45 11 12.88 9.61 0.75 
1998 0 39 9 10.64 7.71 0.72 
1999 0 41 13 13.57 8.90 0.66 
2000 0 31 9 9.60 6.67 0.69 
2001 0 37 7 8.44 7.21 0.85 
2002 0 40 7 8.77 6.91 0.79 
2003 0 40 4 5.30 5.86 1.11 
2004 0 57 2 4.42 7.52 1.70 
2005 0 19 3 3.47 3.54 1.02 
Table 8. Summary statistics for the number of documents adopted in the Russian regions concerning certification 
 Minimum Maximum Median Average Standard deviation 
Variation 
coefficient 
1994 0 9 1 1.01 1.60 1.58 
1995 0 5 1 1.11 1.32 1.19 
1996 0 9 1 1.48 1.83 1.23 
1997 0 16 1 1.62 2.48 1.54 
1998 0 19 1 1.57 2.66 1.70 
1999 0 16 1 1.73 2.46 1.42 
2000 0 7 1 1.28 1.43 1.12 
2001 0 13 2 2.15 2.34 1.09 
2002 0 11 1 0.98 1.56 1.60 
2003 0 6 0 0.72 1.14 1.59 
2004 0 6 0 0.63 1.17 1.86 
2005 0 4 0 0.37 0.82 2.22 
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A2. Estimation results 
Table A9. Equation 1. Dependent variable — gross regional product 
All regions High performing regions Low performing regions 
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Licensing –0.532 0.416 0.202 –0.743 0.559 0.192 –0.694 0.568 0.224 
Certification –0.312 0.129 0.014 –0.327 0.161 0.043 –0.139 0.208 0.505 
Overall 
registration  
costs –0.279 0.835 0.738 –0.547 0.980 0.577 0.485 0.223 0.032 
Unemployment –0.431 1.745 0.805 –0.891 2.209 0.687 –0.651 28.084 0.982 
Fixed  
capital 0.897 0.082 0.000 0.933 0.095 0.000 0.397 0.268 0.141 
Year 1996 –10.843 1.347 0.000 –11.958 1.875 0.000 –7.914 1.580 0.000 
Year 1997 –7.895  1.308 0.000 –9.099 1.792 0.000 –7.456 1.924 0.000 
Year 1998 –9.046 1.299 0.000 –10.781 1.791 0.000 –8.291 1.917 0.000 
Year 1999 1.348 1.307 0.303 0.283 1.793 0.875 1.468 1.917 0.446 
Year 2000 0.846 1.331 0.526 0.261 1.840 0.887 –0.031 1.755 0.986 
Year 2001 –0.947 1.290 0.463 –2.039 1.796 0.258 –0.820 1.634 0.617 
Year 2002 –2.993 1.276 0.020 –4.197 1.758 0.018 –1.452 1.722 0.401 
Constant 10.116 0.945 0.000 11.795 1.275 0.000 8.884 1.657 0.000 
R2 0.71 0.74 0.46 
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Table A10. Equation 1. Dependent variable — investments 
All regions High performing regions Low performing regions 
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Licensing –0.671 0.708 0.344 –0.703 0.414 0.091 –0.406 2.029 0.842 
Certification 1.474 2.171 0.498 –0.464 1.195 0.698 11.628 7.772 0.138 
Overall 
registration  
costs 0.179 0.143 0.212 0.813 0.740 0.273 0.121 0.083 0.150 
Overall profit 1.069 1.019 0.295 0.610 0.539 0.259 –3.636 4.751 0.446 
Fixed capital 0.182 1.426 0.899 –0.477 0.734 0.516 0.707 0.958 0.463 
Previous year 
investments –0.526 0.056 0.000 0.408 0.067 0.000 –0.686 0.090 0.000 
Number  
of enterprises 29.004 10.216 0.005 2.446 6.311 0.699 51.178 25.499 0.048 
Year 1997 –2.438 23.919 0.919 –12.885 14.326 0.369 68.753 78.300 0.382 
Year 1998 0.640 24.442 0.979 –13.667 14.771 0.356 63.076 80.399 0.435 
Year 1999 22.208 24.482 0.365 24.543 14.508 0.092 92.665 81.869 0.260 
Year 2000 73.987 23.949 0.002 23.045 14.426 0.112 164.85 70.616 0.022 
Year 2001 49.673 22.382 0.027 18.580 13.714 0.177 59.295 65.064 0.364 
Year 2002 51.551 22.762 0.024 16.266 14.016 0.247 99.218 67.460 0.145 
Year 2003 38.201 23.214 0.101 27.441 14.335 0.057 37.845 56.870 0.507 
Constant  –24.361 24.081 0.312 11.012 14.287 0.442 –127.759 82.098 0.123 
R2 0.22 0.58 0.41 
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Table A11. Equation 1. Dependent variable — trade turnover 
All regions High performing regions Low performing regions 
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Licensing –0.119 0.078 0.126 –0.129 0.094 0.170 –0.732 1.480 0.622 
Certification –0.572 0.238 0.017 –0.793 0.272 0.004 0.221 0.538 0.682 
Overall 
registration  
costs –0.126 0.156 0.420 –0.108 0.166 0.517 –0.508 0.591 0.392 
Gross  
regional 
product 0.517 0.089 0.000 0.435 0.097 0.000 0.118 0.026 0.000 
Year 1996 –2.785 0.259 0.000 –2.840 0.326 0.000 –2.323 0.437 0.000 
Year 1997 –3.487 0.254 0.000 –3.628 0.319 0.000 –2.689 0.449 0.000 
Year 1998 –3.161 0.259 0.000 –3.312 0.325 0.000 –2.352 0.468 0.000 
Year 1999 –0.423 0.240 0.079 –0.199 0.302 0.511 –0.804 0.391 0.043 
Year 2000 –1.730 0.234 0.000 –1.723 0.295 0.000 –1.619 0.381 0.000 
Year 2001 –0.494 0.236 0.037 –0.443 0.296 0.135 –0.502 0.389 0.200 
Year 2002 –0.618 0.236 0.009 –0.442 0.293 0.133 –0.680 0.432 0.119 
Constant 4.037 0.205 0.000 4.236 0.254 0.000 3.110 0.391 0.000 
R2 0.51 0.49 0.64 
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Table A12. Equation 2. Dependent variable — Number of enterprises 
All regions High performing regions Low performing regions 
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Licensing 0.311 3.473 0.929 0.124 0.396 0.755 0.101 0.080 0.210 
Certification –0.113 0.106 0.289 –0.788 1.121 0.483 –0.435 0.305 0.158 
Overall 
registration 
costs –0.358 0.664 0.563 –0.568 0.654 0.387 0.717 3.280 0.828 
Gross regional 
product –0.104 0.386 0.787 –0.285 0.390 0.466 0.127 0.140 0.365 
Unemployment –0.184 0.141 0.193 –0.235 0.149 0.118 –0.759 3.827 0.843 
Investments 0.453 0.233 0.053 0.116 0.061 0.060 0.349 0.299 0.246 
Number  
of enterprises  
in the previous 
year 0.514 0.056 0.000 0.519 0.063 0.000 0.500 0.120 0.000 
Year 1997 –0.465 0.109 0.000 –0.503 0.130 0.000 –0.313 0.242 0.201 
Year 1998 –0.624 0.111 0.000 –0.595 0.134 0.000 –0.589 0.243 0.018 
Year 1999 –0.281 0.106 0.009 –0.327 0.126 0.010 –0.251 0.201 0.216 
Year 2000 –0.256 0.107 0.018 –0.323 0.126 0.011 –0.126 0.214 0.559 
Year 2001 –0.223 0.102 0.029 –0.311 0.120 0.010 –0.046 0.198 0.816 
Year 2002 –0.251 0.101 0.014 –0.183 0.118 0.121 –0.530 0.229 0.023 
Constant 0.979 0.123 0.000 1.002 0.149 0.000 0.823 0.261 0.002 
R2 0.84 0.87 0.78 
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Table A13. Equation 2. Dependent variable — Number of small business enterprises 
All regions High performing regions Low performing regions 
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Licensing –0.127 0.074 0.085 –0.155 0.085 0.070 –0.126 0.158 0.426 
Certification –0.148 0.224 0.508 –0.361 0.240 0.135 0.342 0.616 0.581 
Overall 
registration costs 0.397 1.410 0.778 0.127 1.410 0.928 0.619 0.658 0.349 
Unemployment 0.507 0.299 0.091 0.309 0.322 0.338 0.139 0.078 0.079 
Инвестиции –0.464 0.492 0.347 –0.169 0.133 0.205 –0.524 0.591 0.378 
Number of small 
enterprises in the 
previous year –0.111 0.060 0.066 –0.114 0.070 0.104 –0.168 0.128 0.195 
Year 1998 0.323 0.210 0.125 –0.162 0.250 0.519 –0.643 0.395 0.107 
Year 1999 0.605 0.217 0.006 0.388 0.262 0.140 1.235 0.411 0.004 
Year 2000 0.338 0.246 0.171 0.116 0.291 0.691 1.064 0.501 0.037 
Year 2001 0.207 0.225 0.357 –0.009 0.272 0.974 0.791 0.455 0.086 
Year 2002 0.383 0.227 0.092 0.455 0.272 0.096 0.496 0.447 0.270 
Year 2003 0.092 0.217 0.673 0.126 0.270 0.642 0.232 0.417 0.579 
Constant –0.259 0.156 0.099 –0.080 0.184 0.663 –0.700 0.307 0.025 
R2 0.05 0.06 0.14 
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Table A14. Equation 3. Dependent variable — Overall registration costs 
All regions High performing regions Low performing regions 
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Illness 4.230 5.962 0.479 5.248 9.457 0.580 3.715 4.043 0.361 
Pollution 7034.441 10391.94 0.498 11444.37 15042.49 0.448 –633.436 7942.077 0.937 
Profit 55.151 59.198 0.352 43.412 81.649 0.596 168.451 54.783 0.003 
Year 1997 2030.337 930.946 0.030 2566.923 1411.374 0.071 1057.17 638.998 0.102 
Year 1998 3076.558 892.698 0.001 3664.888 1350.162 0.007 2076.982 620.732 0.001 
Year 1999 979.333 891.827 0.273 1083.293 1283.156 0.400 463.472 689.856 0.503 
Year 2000 1216.758 868.074 0.162 1241.02 1272.55 0.331 1059.814 622.808 0.092 
Year 2001 1525.405 869.694 0.081 1561.086 1284.596 0.226 1489.001 615.603 0.018 
Year 2002 1626.334 908.704 0.075 1703.734 1347.975 0.208 1558 653.604 0.019 
Constant –728.537 638.578 0.255 –814.868 957.328 0.396 –622.623 459.415 0.178 
R2 0.04 0.04 0.20 
Table A15. Equation 3. Dependent variable — Certification 
All regions High performing regions Low performing regions 
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Illness –0.270 0.209 0.198 –0.407 0.364 0.264 –0.259 0.223 0.248 
Pollution –1.640 4.779 0.732 –0.112 6.228 0.986 –3.766 7.291 0.606 
Profit –0.361 0.222 0.104 –0.328 0.213 0.125 –0.308 0.418 0.462 
Year 1997 0.030 0.335 0.929 0.195 0.475 0.682 –0.337 0.438 0.443 
Year 1998 –0.037 0.325 0.909 0.116 0.450 0.797 –0.226 0.437 0.606 
Year 1999 0.298 0.315 0.345 0.348 0.428 0.416 0.191 0.436 0.662 
Year 2000 –0.309 0.314 0.325 –0.294 0.430 0.495 –0.270 0.425 0.527 
Year 2001 0.984 0.320 0.002 0.925 0.436 0.035 1.147 0.437 0.009 
Year 2002 –1.299 0.327 0.000 –0.955 0.449 0.034 –1.905 0.441 0.000 
Constant –0.003 0.193 0.989 –0.060 0.270 0.825 0.085 0.255 0.738 
R2 0.08 0.06 0.18 
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Table A15. Equation 3. Dependent variable — Licensing 
All regions High performing regions Low performing regions 
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Illness 0.124 0.754 0.870 0.647 1.261 0.608 –0.156 0.903 0.863 
Pollution 4.184 17.229 0.808 –2.971 21.598 0.891 13.568 29.474 0.646 
Profit 0.508 0.646 0.431 0.421 0.738 0.569 –0.390 1.689 0.818 
Year 1997 1.224 1.207 0.311 0.605 1.646 0.713 2.399 1.772 0.177 
Year 1998 0.513 1.173 0.662 –0.661 1.559 0.672 2.187 1.767 0.218 
Year 1999 5.101 1.136 0.000 4.427 1.484 0.003 6.421 1.762 0.000 
Year 2000 –1.468 1.132 0.195 –1.221 1.491 0.413 –2.192 1.718 0.204 
Year 2001 1.440 1.152 0.212 0.672 1.513 0.657 2.606 1.765 0.142 
Year 2002 2.997 1.178 0.011 2.302 1.557 0.140 3.957 1.783 0.028 
Constant –2.567 0.695 0.000 –2.229 0.938 0.018 –2.982 1.030 0.004 
R2 0.06 0.04 0.12 
Table A16. Equation 4. Dependent variable — Illness 
All regions High performing regions Low performing regions 
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Licensing –0.220 0.282 0.436 –0.187 0.345 0.589 –0.494 0.519 0.343 
Certification 0.909 0.859 0.290 1.421 0.995 0.155 –1.691 1.848 0.362 
Overall 
registration costs 0.333 0.580 0.567 –0.020 0.063 0.975 4.949 2.018 0.016 
Illness in the 
previous year –0.266 0.056 0.000 –0.293 0.077 0.000 –0.194 0.084 0.023 
Year 1997 26.117 9.271 0.005 23.905 12.071 0.049 28.596 13.772 0.040 
Year 1998 20.563 8.606 0.017 33.370 11.026 0.003 –9.938 13.196 0.453 
Year 1999 56.664 8.658 0.000 57.557 11.090 0.000 50.715 13.627 0.000 
Year 2000 54.693 8.970 0.000 47.832 11.405 0.000 62.592 13.854 0.000 
Year 2001 12.979 8.628 0.134 18.591 10.935 0.091 –7.118 13.586 0.601 
Year 2002 38.228 8.694 0.000 36.757 11.016 0.001 39.593 13.489 0.004 
Year 2003 27.408 8.735 0.002 27.034 10.984 0.015 16.519 14.895 0.270 
Constant –15.276 6.122 0.013 –16.456 7.786 0.036 –10.460 9.545 0.276 
R2 0.22 0.18 0.43 
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Table A17. Equation 4. Dependent variable — Pollution 
All regions High performing regions Low performing regions 
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Licensing –0.205 0.201 0.310 –0.280 0.196 0.155 –0.215 0.318 0.502 
Certification –0.198 0.483 0.682 –0.550 0.547 0.316 0.163 0.112 0.150 
Overall 
registration 
costs 0.417 0.390 0.286 0.319 0.411 0.439 0.195 0.161 0.230 
Pollution  
in the previous 
year –0.473 5.701 0.934 7.967 7.412 0.284 –0.190 0.099 0.060 
Profit –0.132 0.031 0.000 –0.110 0.037 0.004 –0.120 0.075 0.113 
Gross regional 
product 0.640 0.234 0.007 0.604 0.270 0.027 –0.280 0.590 0.726 
Year 1998 –0.003 0.005 0.504 –0.001 0.006 0.892 –0.002 0.008 0.758 
Year 1999 –0.0003 0.005 0.959 0.003 0.007 0.646 –0.0001 0.009 0.996 
Year 2000 0.003 0.005 0.543 0.008 0.006 0.216 0.001 0.009 0.892 
Year 2001 –0.0001 0.006 0.982 0.001 0.007 0.873 0.005 0.009 0.585 
Year 2002 –0.002 0.005 0.724 0.004 0.007 0.559 –0.006 0.009 0.537 
Year 2003 –0.002 0.006 0.782 0.001 0.007 0.936 0.007 0.010 0.456 
Constant –0.003 0.004 0.400 –0.003 0.004 0.526 –0.005 0.006 0.372 
R2 0.33 0.47 0.07 
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Table A18. Equation 5. Dependent variables — Corruption perception indexes 
Dependent variable 
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Registration cost of an 
enterprise without foreign 
investors participation  
0.305 
(0.532) 
0.575 –0.148 
(0.239) 
0.544 0.105 
(0.145) 
0.478 0.132 
(0.161) 
0.423 
Duration of the registration 
procedure for an enterprise 
without foreign investors 
participation 
0.140 
(0.453) 
0.762 –0.341 
(0.204) 
0.114 0.124 
(0.123) 
0.330 0.166 
(0.137) 
0.244 
Additional documents for 
registration of an enterprise 
without foreign investors  
participation 
0.130 
(0.050) 
0.019 0.023 
(0.022) 
0.317 0.028 
(0.014) 
0.053 0.034 
(0.015) 
0.036 
Registration cost of an 
enterprise with foreign 
investors  participation  
–0.164 
(0.189) 
0.398 0.503 
(0.851) 
0.563 0.095 
(0.514) 
0.855 –0.401 
(0.571) 
0.493 
Duration of the registration 
procedure for an enterprise 
with foreign investors  
participation 
–0.331 
(0.418) 
0.440 0.352 
(0.188) 
0.079 0.064 
(0.114) 
0.583 –0.060 
(0.126) 
0.644 
Additional documents for 
registration of an enterprise 
with foreign investors 
participation 
0.078 
(0.072) 
0.291 0.005 
(0.032) 
0.889 –0.008 
(0.019) 
0.700 –0.004 
(0.022) 
0.863 
Certification –0.019 
(0.028) 
0.513 0.012 
(0.013) 
0.348 –0.010 
(0.008) 
0.190 –0.0002 
(0.008) 
0.981 
Licensing 0.002 
(0.007) 
0.796 0.002 
(0.003) 
0.465 –0.001 
(0.002) 
0.486 –0.002 
(0.002) 
0.456 
Overall profit –1.480 
(0.661) 
0.040 0.035 
(0.297) 
0.907 –0.239 
(0.180) 
0.203 –0.045 
(0.020) 
0.037 
Constant 0.578 
(0.087) 
0.000 0.439 
(0.039) 
0.000 0.694 
(0.024) 
0.000 0.669 
(0.026) 
0.000 
R2 0.05 0.25 0.05 0.13 
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